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Big business in Belarus 
- its genesis, conditions and prospects
Kamil Kłysiński
Over the past ten to twenty years, Belarus has seen a steep rise in the number of local dol-
lar millionaires. This has somewhat undermined the myth of an egalitarian model of society 
promoted through the Belarusian state propaganda. There is a small group of businessmen 
among the top earners who, in exchange for their political loyalty and their consent to share 
profits with those in power, have enjoyed a number of privileges that allow them to safely 
conduct business in an environment typically hostile to private enterprise. The favourable con-
ditions under which they are operating have enabled them not only to accumulate substantial 
capital, but also to invest it abroad. However, since such businesses are seen as providing 
a financial safety net for the regime, in 2011 and 2012 some of their directors received an EU 
travel ban, while their companies were subjected to economic sanctions by Brussels. At the 
same time, fearing that Belarus’s big business could become powerful enough to influence the 
country’s political scene (as has been the case in Russia and Ukraine), Alexander Lukashenka 
has actively prevented such players from becoming too independent. Consequently, Belarus 
has so far not developed its own elite class of oligarchs who would be able to actively influ-
ence government policy. The current informal agreement between the government in Minsk 
and big business has proved stable and is unlikely to change in the near future. Nonetheless, 
a reordering of state power giving Belarus’s big business significant political influence would 
be possible should Mr Lukashenka lose power in the next presidential election.
The origins of big business in Belarus
The notion of social justice and equality is one 
of the cornerstones of the Belarusian socio- 
-economic model1. It is, furthermore, one of the 
main propaganda slogans of the Lukashenka re-
1 This paper attempts to present an in-depth analysis of 
the activities of a group of the wealthiest Belarusian 
businessmen, and of their relations with the regime. So 
far, there have been only a handful of extensive newspa-
per articles focusing on this group. Most of the available 
information, however, is highly speculative, and tends to 
be based on rumours and unofficial data. This presents 
a significant difficulty in analysing these developments. 
The author has made every effort to base his analysis on 
the most reliable information while drawing the reader’s 
attention to issues which are difficult to verify.
gime. The Belarusian president has repeatedly 
assured his people that there is no place for oli-
garchs and multimillionaires in the country un-
der his leadership. By taking this position, the 
government has managed to prevent extreme 
economic divisions in Belarusian society - a pro-
blem which continues to plague, for example, 
its neighbour Russia2. Lukashenka hopes that 
2 Alexander Lukashenka often addresses this issue during 
meetings with Russian journalists. See, for example, 
Sergey Dorenko’s 2011 interview, http://www.interfax.
by/news/belarus/132440 and this year’s World Congress 
of the Russian Press in Minsk: http://www.regnum.ru/
news/1480580.html. By doing so, Lukashenka is attempt-
ing to point out the differences between the oligarchic sys-
tem in Russia and the Belarusian model of social justice.
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this will allow him to retain his image as ‘father 
of the nation’, the defender of ordinary Belaru-
sians (he first created this image in the 1990s). 
The approach is in keeping with the unwritten 
social contract between the government and 
the Belarusian people, which has for many years 
now won the president relatively high levels of 
public support and has discouraged Belarusians 
from joining large-scale protests staged by the 
opposition.
In reality, however, over the past decade or so, 
Belarus has seen the emergence of a relatively 
large group of very wealthy individuals, inclu-
ding a number of so-called “dollar millionaires”. 
A report issued last year by the international 
agency Wealth-X puts the number of Belarusian 
multimillionaires at 115, with an estimated joint 
wealth of $13 billion3. It is clear that under an 
authoritarian system of government, and with 
Minsk’s tight control over the economy, large 
companies are unlikely to do well without some 
degree of support from the central authorities, 
since they object in principle to excessive gro-
wth in the private sector. This resistance stems 
from the fact that the Belarusian government 
wants to maintain the dominant position pu-
blic sector companies have and thereby to reta-
in its current control of the country’s economic 
system and, by extension, of Belarusian socie-
ty4. Under these conditions, it is impossible to 
accumulate substantial capital, and to set up, 
efficiently operate and expand private busines-
ses without tacit consent from the government. 
Such consent, however, is usually negotiated 
through informal links with representatives of 
the regime and is contingent on winning the 
trust of the country’s top leaders.
This is evidenced by a slump in the fortunes 
of the first wave of Belarusian entrepreneurs, 
3 Based on the criteria adopted by Wealth-X, only those 
individuals with assets worth more than $30 million can 
be defined as multimillionaires. For more information, 
see. http://naviny.by/rubrics/finance/2012/10/17/ic_arti-
cles_114_17 9599/
4 The public sector produces about 70% of the country’s 
GDP and employs about two thirds of its citizens.
who began to amass great wealth back in the 
1990s by taking advantage of the new business 
opportunities emerging after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. After Alexander Lukashenka’s 
rise to power in 1994, however, some of them 
failed to secure the backing of the new admini-
stration. Among them were high-profile busi-
ness figures such as Leonid Volk (trade in non-
-ferrous metals and gold), Alexandr Pupeyko 
(export and re-export of goods through Belarus 
to Russia), Ihar Pinkevich (grains market), Valery 
Shumsky (trade in oil and oil products), Andrei 
Klimov (construction industry, real estate) and 
Valery Kolosovsky (pharmaceuticals). Over the 
next few years, despite their earlier successes 
and growing profits, these individuals were 
subjected to repeated audits and financial pe-
nalties. All this subsequently drove them out of 
business and, in some cases, it forced them to 
emigrate5. Regardless of the official reasons for 
the sanctions levied against these businesses 
(some of which, such as tax evasion, may have 
been well-founded), it seems that the main 
motivation behind Alexander Lukashenka’s ac-
tions was to eliminate any entrepreneurs from 
the market who had become too independent 
and did not owe their wealth to the new presi-
dent. There was a risk that they would not be 
loyal to the new regime and potentially support 
other political groups, including the then relati-
vely strong Belarusian opposition. At the same 
time, a new group of businessmen, backed by 
5 See: http://management.bel.biz/news/belorusskie_oli-
garhi_pervoj_volny_desyat_klyuchevyh_figur/
Over the past ten to twenty years, Bela-
rus has seen a steep rise in the number of 
very wealthy individuals. The internation-
al agency Wealth-X last year estimated 
that there are115 so-called “dollar multi- 
-millionaires”.
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the new administration, began to gradually 
replace the first wave of Belarusian entrepre-
neurs. And although most of them had been 
present on the Belarusian business scene befo-
re, the dynamic growth of their companies was 
clearly facilitated by Alexander Lukashenka’s 
rise to power.
The wealth of the current Belarusian 
business elite
It is possible to single out a small group of par-
ticularly influential individuals among Belarus’s 
multimillionaires who for years have enjoyed 
special treatment and have substantially in-
creased their assets - either through lucrative 
contracts, or through rather rare privatisation 
opportunities. According to available reports6, 
Belarus’s wealthiest entrepreneur, Uladzimir 
Peftiev, is worth an estimated $1 billion, poten-
tially making him the only Belarusian billionaire. 
Peftiev’s assets include: Beltechexport (export 
of arms and military equipment)7, BT Telecom-
munications (investment in advanced techno-
logies), Sport Pari (lotteries, gambling), Delo-
vaya Set (Internet service provider), as well as 
Akvadiv distillery and a number of investments 
in logistics and real estate. Another member 
of the Belarusian business elite is Yury Chyzh. 
Among his assets, he owns Triple Group, which 
6 Due to the reluctance of Belarusian companies to fully 
disclose their revenues and assets, all figures reported 
in this paper are based solely on publicly available esti-
mates and the speculations of independent Belarusian 
journalists and experts. The main source of this data is 
a 2012 ranking of the 200 wealthiest and most influen-
tial Belarusian entrepreneurs, published by the Belaru-
sian online newspaper Yezhednevnik. For more informa-
tion, see http://www.ej.by/rating/business2011/
7 In May 2012, Peftiev’s controlling stake in the company 
was acquired by a previously unknown Russian business-
man, Dmitry Gurinovich. Some sources have claimed 
that the transaction was a front. Although there is no 
conclusive evidence for this suggestion, it has been ar-
gued that Peftiev’s shares were sold to Gurinovich to 
free Beltechexport from EU sanctions, which the com-
pany (along with Peftiev’s two other businesses) was 
made subject to in 2011, following suspicions that it was 
offering financial support to the Belarusian regime.
includes over twenty subsidiaries across a range 
of sectors, including construction and the ma-
nufacture of building materials, the production 
of foodstuffs, catering, and tourism. Another 
important area for Yury Chyzh is the petro-
chemical industry - his three companies: Neo-
nafta, Trayplenergo and Belneftegaz have in 
recent years supplied Russian oil to Belarusian 
refineries and exported Belarusian oil products 
to the EU and Ukraine8. Yury Chyzh’s total we-
alth has been estimated at approximately $200 
million. Other leading Belarusian entrepreneu-
rs include: Alexander Shakutin - the owner of 
Amkodor, one of the largest manufacturers of 
construction equipment and civil engineering 
machinery in the CIS and Eastern Europe; and 
Alexander Moshensky, operating in the food 
industry, who owns the dairy producer Savush-
kin Product, as well as the fish and seafood 
processing plant Santa Bremor. The assets of 
the two businessmen have been estimated at 
$150 million and $90 million respectively. The 
list also includes Anatoly Ternavsky, the owner 
of Univest-M, a corporate group operating in 
the construction industry, including real esta-
te development. However, Ternavsky, as with 
Yury Chyzh, has for many years been involved 
in supplying Russian oil to Belarusian refineries 
8 EU sanctions were also imposed on Chyzh and his 18 com-
panies constituting Triple Group. After the EU failed to 
reach consensus, three of these companies operating in the 
energy market were exempted from the sanctions, and to 
avoid difficulties in operating in EU markets, Chyzh separat-
ed them from Triple Group. At present, there is no reliable 
information about the current status of these companies.
It is possible to single out a small group of 
particularly influential individuals among 
Belarus’s multimillionaires who for years 
have enjoyed preferential treatment and 
have substantially increased their assets.
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and exporting petroleum products to the EU9. 
Additionally, as the owner of an oil storage fa-
cility in south-eastern Belarus, Ternavsky holds 
a licence for the supply of oil products to do-
mestic wholesalers. The investment portfolio 
of Ternavsky’s Univest-M groups is currently 
worth approximately $1 billion.
The symbiotic relationship between 
the regime and private capital
A closer analysis of the activities of big business 
in Belarus indicates the existence of an infor-
mal agreement between the incumbent regi-
me and individual entrepreneurs. By complying 
with the unwritten rules of mutual coexistence, 
both parties are able to reap significant finan-
cial benefits. Under the deal, the companies 
are expected to refrain from supporting or fi-
nancing the Belarusian opposition - although 
this appears to be a blanket ban affecting the 
country’s entire private sector. Furthermore, 
Alexander Lukashenka, fearing the regime’s po-
wer may wane, has consistently prevented any 
members of the Belarusian business elite from 
taking high public office10. On the other hand, 
he has also blocked calls from the local nomen-
klatura (raised mostly by high-ranking officials), 
for privileged property rights to be granted 
to them, in order to protect himself from the 
emergence of strong centres of influence. Be-
larusian multimillionaires are also required to 
keep their wealth private, so as not to destroy 
the ideals of social equality that many Belaru-
9 Along with Peftiev and Chyzh, Ternavsky is the third Belar-
usian businessman whose companies were made subject 
to EU sanctions. Following Chyzh’s example, Ternavsky 
also decided to remove its oil companies from the Uni-
vest-M holding in 2012, making it difficult to access infor-
mation about their business activities. According to un-
official data, after losing access to EU markets, Ternavsky 
redirected the export of oil products to Ukraine.
10 The only exception in the group of businessmen with 
close links to the president is Alexander Shakutin, who 
is currently serving his second term as a senator in the 
Council of the Republic (the upper chamber of the Belar-
usian parliament). However, under the current political 
system, the Belarusian legislature has no significant im-
pact on state policy. The post should therefore be seen 
more as a mark of prestige. 
sians still believe in, and to avoid creating the 
impression that some Belarusian citizens are 
significantly wealthier than high-level govern-
ment officials, including the president.
One of the important elements of the 
agreement between government and business 
is an informal obligation to provide funding for 
sports and the necessary sports facilities. Due 
to this Yury Chyzh has owned and bankrolled 
the Minsk-based Dynamo Football Club for 
over a decade. He is also the chairman of the 
Belarusian Wrestling Federation, and is known 
for investing in the development of sports in-
frastructure, including the construction of ice 
hockey rinks and the renovation of the Dynamo 
football stadium in Minsk. Meanwhile, Uladzi-
mir Peftiev served for a number of years as the 
president of the Belarusian Tennis Federation, 
and together with Yury Chyzh and Anatoly Ter-
navsky, Peftiev has been an official sponsor of 
the Presidential Sports Club, managed by Lu-
kashenka’s second son, Dzmitry. Although only 
donations to Belarusian sport are disclosed to 
the public, it seems very likely that through 
the unofficial and informal cooperation me-
chanisms and profit sharing, local big business 
also supports the Belarusian state, and perhaps 
even individual state officials, also in other are-
as11. It is worth noting that the leading repre-
sentatives of Belarus’s big business, particularly 
11 Much of the information on this subject consists of un-
verifiable speculation. Unofficial sources have suggested 
that several years ago Yury Chyzh’s Triple group signed 
a contract for the construction of a luxurious presiden-
tial residence in the primeval forest of Belovezhskaya 
Pushcha. It is possible that the cost of the construction 
will be met entirely by the contractor.
Currently in Belarus there exists an infor-
mal agreement between the incumbent 
regime and individual entrepreneurs. By 
complying with the unwritten rules of mu-
tual coexistence, both parties are able to 
reap significant financial benefits.
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Yury Chyzh, Anatoly Ternavsky and Uladzimir 
Peftiev, have close links to the President’s two 
adult sons Viktor and Dzmitry, which further 
strengthens their position12. The exceptional 
status of these individuals is evidenced by the 
lack of “reshuffles” within the group, and the 
fact that so far not a single member of the bu-
siness elite has been arrested or has had his as-
sets confiscated by the authorities13. One may 
conclude therefore that the group constitutes 
an essential part of the financial safety net of 
the Belarusian regime. This prompted the Eu-
ropean Union to issue economic and visa sanc-
tions against several Belarusian businessmen 
(Chyzh, Peftiev and Ternavsky) for two conse-
cutive years: 2011 and 2012. 
In recent years, the Belarusian government 
has considered the possibility of recruiting the 
richest private entrepreneurs to its task of es-
tablishing several national holding companies 
capable of technological modernisation and 
able to compete in foreign markets. At the 
time, some experts suggested that Alexander 
Lukashenka was seeking to create his own gro-
up of oligarchs, meant as a counterbalance to 
Russian corporations interested in acquiring 
strategic assets in Belarusian heavy industry14. 
However, it seems unlikely that the Belarusian 
business elite has sufficient capital at its dispo-
12 According to unconfirmed reports, Ternavsky’s Uni-
vest-M employs the wife of Dzmitry Lukashenka, the 
president’s younger son. While the wife of Lukashenka’s 
older son Viktar, allegedly works for one of the compa-
nies owned by Uladzimir Peftiev. There are also rumours 
suggesting the president’s two sons, and particularly 
Viktar Lukashenka who coordinates the security sector, 
have been providing the necessary support and protec-
tion for the businesses owned by Ternavsky and Peftiev.
13 With the exception of the entrepreneur and banker Vik-
tor Shevtsov, who was arrested in 2011 despite his close 
links to the Belarusian regime. The exact circumstances 
of his arrest, however, remain unclear. In addition, the 
Belarusian media occasionally publish reports alleging 
a breakdown in the relations between Belarus’s wealthi-
est businessmen and Alexander Lukashenka or his sons. 
So far, however, none of these allegations have been 
borne out by reality.
14 This hypothesis was put forward by, for example, the 
Belarusian independent economist Yaroslav Roman-
chuk; see. http://m.wyborcza.pl/wyborcza/1,105226, 
11317566,Oligarchowie_Lukaszenki.html 
sal to compete against much stronger players 
from Russia. The matter is further complicated 
by the fact that the majority of Belarusian entre-
preneurs have developed close links with their 
Russian business partners (for example, the im-
porters of Russian oil: Ternavsky and Chyzh), 
which renders the alleged plans for a confron-
tation highly improbable. This could be the re-
ason the central authorities have so far focused 
on establishing holding companies primarily on 
the basis of state-owned businesses15. This mi-
ght also explain why the Belarusian president 
has decided not to press on with the large scale 
privatisation of state-owned companies.
In exchange for their loyalty, full dependence 
on the central authorities, lack of political am-
bition, as well as their unquestioning coope-
ration and consent to share profits, the key 
players in the Belarusian business sector can 
count on far-reaching privileges, guaranteeing 
them an opportunity to amass vast fortunes. 
The government has decided to grant private 
corporations access to highly profitable  indu-
stries which are critical for national security, 
such as telecommunications and the arms tra-
de (Peftiev), or crude oil imports and the export 
of petroleum products to the EU and Ukraine 
(Chyzh and Ternavsky). This indicates the regi-
me’s trust in some businessmen and that they 
enjoy a special status.
15 In 2012, Amkodor was used to establish a holding compa-
ny of the same name; later that year, however, the central 
authorities blocked a previously announced project to 
create a holding company based on the dairy plant Sa-
vushkin Product, owned by Alexander Moshensky.
The government has decided to grant pri-
vate corporations access to highly profita-
ble industries which are critical for national 
security, such as the arms trade or the ex-
port of petroleum products. This indicates 
the regime’s trust in some businessmen and 
that they enjoy a special status.
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It is worth noting that the main company re-
sponsible for the immensely profitable16 re-
-export of Russian petroleum products in the 
form of solvents and diluents to the EU in 2012 
was Interservice, owned by Nikolai Vorobei, 
a businessman with close links to Yury Chyzh. 
The legality of this arrangement was subse- 
quently questioned, and in August 2012 Russia 
successfully blocked further shipments. Until 
then, however, this trade was one of the main 
sources of foreign currency for the Belarusian 
budget, and therefore it could only have been 
controlled by a company with close links to 
the government. The privileged position of the 
Belarusian business elite is also evidenced by 
the fact that, although in principle Alexander 
Lukashenka has objected to calls for privatisa-
tion, he has on several occasions issued special 
decrees allowing individual entrepreneurs to 
acquire state-owned companies at prices si-
gnificantly lower than their market value. Such 
a decree paved the way for Alexander Shakutin 
to obtain permission in 2011 to acquire three 
state-owned heavy equipment manufacturers, 
while in 2012 Nikolai Vorobei was allowed to 
buy a feed concentrate production plant in Na-
vapolatsk17. Occasionally, the privileges enjoyed 
by trusted entrepreneurs take on a virtually feu-
dal dimension, as was the case in August 2012 
when Yury Chyzh was allowed to lease over 300 
16 The revenue generated from re-exporting these prod-
ucts in 2012 reached more than $2.7 billion.
17 According to an approved investment plan, by 2021 the 
plant is to be converted into Belarus’s third refinery (in 
addition to the refineries in Navapolatsk and Mazyr). Its 
target capacity has been set at 1.5 million tonnes of pe-
troleum products.
hectares of land near his home village of Sabali 
(Brest region) by special presidential decree in 
order to build an open-air ethnographical mu-
seum18. Recently, the preferential treatment has 
been followed by a series of honours awarded 
to the key members of the business elite: In 
June last year, Alexander Lukashenka awarded 
state decorations to Alexander Moshensky and 
Yury Chyzh. Moreover, the wealth accumula-
ted by these individuals, through the govern-
ment’s implicit support, has also enabled them 
to invest their money abroad. Yury Chyzh now 
owns two businesses in Latvia - Mamas D. (bio-
fuel production) and Alus D. (breweries)19. In 
late 2012 Alexander Moshenky purchased the 
Russian fish processing plant Russkoye More for 
$52 million, and Alexander Shakutin is currently 
negotiating the acquisition of several Serbian 
engineering plants set for privatisation.
Conclusions 
Since Alexander Lukashenka’s rise to power ne-
arly twenty years ago, Belarus has witnessed the 
emergence of a large group of wealthy business-
men who owe their success largely to the tacit 
support offered to them by the current regime. 
In exchange, the government demands political 
loyalty from them along with a share of their 
profits. The business elite is made up of a small 
group of particularly privileged businessmen 
with very close links to Alexander Lukashenka 
and his family. With the regime’s approval, the 
members of the group have been steadily buil-
ding up their assets and have facilitated a series 
of ventures, which were both highly lucrative and 
vital to the national interest, such as the export 
of petroleum products or the arms trade.
18 See: http://pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=3871&p0=P31200 
369&p1=1
19 A report published in December 2012 suggested that 
Chyzh’s stake in Mamas D. had been either transferred 
or sold (the details remain unclear). The shares are now 
owned by two Belarusian citizens working for one of the 
companies belonging to Chyzh’s Triple Group. It is there-
fore likely that the change of ownership was simply an 
attempt to evade EU sanctions.
The informal agreement governing the 
relations between Lukashenka’s regime 
and big business has so far proved highly 
effective, stable, and capable of bringing 
tangible benefits to both parties.
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The informal agreement governing the rela-
tions between Lukashenka’s regime and big 
business has so far proved highly effective, sta-
ble, and capable of bringing tangible benefits 
to both parties. It does not, however, guaran-
tee the system long-term stability. It is possi-
ble that local business leaders will begin to call 
for greater autonomy as the amount of capital 
accumulated by big business increases and the 
position of Belarusian firms in foreign markets 
strengthens. This may also lead to them de-
manding the possibility to shape public policy 
or to them seeking an active role in running 
large and strategically important state-owned 
businesses. Being aware of this danger, Alexan-
der Lukashenka has been trying to hold back 
the leading Belarusian entrepreneurs and has 
blocked privatisation initiatives which would 
benefit them. These efforts have been aimed 
at preventing the emergence of a new class of 
oligarchs in the country. The president has also 
taken measures to block an excessive influx of 
big capital from abroad, especially from Russia. 
Lukashenka is aware that groups of influential 
oligarchs in both Ukraine and Russia will with 
varying levels of intensity and success try to 
influence state policy in Belarus and to affect 
economic decisions. Such a turn of events wo-
uld directly threaten the president’s position, 
and so the ‘oligarchisation‘ of the Belarusian 
political system is unlikely to begin in earnest 
until after Alexander Lukashenka leaves power.
